Variation #16
By Konrad Will
Print: Variated Edition 10/18
Frame: destroyed section of a vehicle
The ferocity and ingenuity exhibited by Ukrainian military and paramilitary forces in response to the 2022 invasion shocked and inspired the world. Adapting swiftly to unfolding events, Ukrainians initially proved to be a nimble and agile force against the seemingly monolithic invading army. Using their knowledge of the Russian language, Ukrainians intercepted Russian communications to plan ambushes. Faced with a shortage of military equipment, they combed through obsolete weaponry depots, salvaged parts from wrecked Russian vehicles, and attached them all to anything that could be made mobile, creating makeshift constructions dubbed “Frankenvehicles” that proved surprisingly effective against the initial invasion.(A) By the end of 2022, many Ukrainians hoped that their David might actually repel the Russian Goliath.
By the early months of 2024, these hopes had faded. Ukraine’s counteroffensive during the summer of 2023 failed. Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers were killed or injured, yet they advanced less than 15 miles into Russian-controlled territory. Many factors contributing to this failure, including improved Russian reconnaissance, a devastating Russian minefield campaign, and the US’s inability to deliver promised foreign aid.(B) Still, external forces were not the only reasons why the push failed. Kyiv’s delay in launching the counteroffensive and the decision to send underprepared soldiers into frontline combat also played significant roles. Regardless of the causes, the failure of the counteroffensive was a costly misstep.
Today, the majority of Ukraine’s soldiers are deployed along the 600+ mile frontline, where they continue to be outmanned and outgunned. Barricaded in trenches, under constant assault by Russian troops and weapons, they are surrounded by death. These soldiers are physically and emotionally exhausted. They need time away from the front to rest and recuperate, but reinforcements are scarce.(C) The August 6th incursion by Ukraine into Russia provided a significant boost to morale, but it remains uncertain whether this will result in a long-term positive outcome.
When Russia invaded, Ukraine’s active military forces numbered fewer than 200, 000; today, that number is close to one million. The average age of a frontline Ukrainian soldier is over 40. Before the invasion, these men were artists, salesmen, entrepreneurs—middle-aged civilians with lives and careers and commitments—who never imagined they would find themselves trapped in trenches, fighting for their lives to defend their loved ones and their country. Yet, they will tell you that allowing Russia to win is not an option. These soldiers know all to well the horrors that Putin’s Russia is capable of; they are living that nightmare now. Hopefully, the world is still paying attention.
A) For more on Ukraine’s military adoption of unconventional materials, see Variation #21.
B) For more information about landmines, see Variation #22.
C) For more information on Ukraine’s mobilization issues, see Variation #20.
‘Putin is a Fool’: Intercepted Calls Reveal Russian Army in Disarray, The New York Times, 28 Sept 22.
Bolting Random Weapons on Random Chassis, the Ukrainian Army Proves Its Ingenuity… And Desperation, Forbes, 19 Dec 22.
Ukraine confirms its counter-offensive has failed. Day 617 of the war, Center for Eastern Studies, OSW, 03 Nov 23.
Front-line Ukrainian infantry units report acute shortage of soldiers, The Washington Post, 08 Feb 24.
Comparison of the military capabilities of Russia and Ukraine as of 2024, Statista, 26 Apr 24.
Russia’s War in Ukraine—Two Decisive Factors, Jams, Vol. 14, No.2, Marine Corps University Press, 02 Nov 23.
Old men belong here. How Ukrainian Armed Forces have become 40+ age army and whether lowing the mobilization age will affect combat capability, Ukrainska Pravda, 16 May 24.
Life on Ukraine’s front line: ‘Worse than hell’ as Russia advances, Reuters, 29 May 24.